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The primary objective of this thesis is to familiar-
ize the reader with the bucket decision making processes
and considerations which influence the formulation of
the Department of the Navy's (DON) budget from the
perspective of the Office of Budget and Reports (OBR),
the impact of resource allocation (budgetary) decisions
upon the overall framework within which DON budgetary
decisions are made, the organizational structures of the
Office of the Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) and the
Office of Budget and Reports (OBR) are outlined and
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This thesis is primarily concerned with the budget
decision processes within the Department of the Navy
(DOil). Included will be an overview of the environmental
framework within which the budgeting process is con-
ducted, the functions which a budget performs and its
characteristics, and a description of how budgeting fits
into general decision making tneory. The Department of
the ilavy (DON) oudget process is guided by the Comptrol-
ler of the ilavy ( NAVCOMPT)
,
Director of Budget and
Reports (.'iCB) and the Director of the Fiscal Management
Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(OP-92). '.Je will outline tne internal and external
organizational relat ionsnips of these units as well as
tne functions performed by these departments and tne
responsibilities assigned to their subunits. A general
overview and more detailed investigation of tne specifics
of the budget decision making process are examined from
tne various departmental perspectives and coordination of
these decision efforts will be discussed at length.
Certain methodology was used to gather the data,
ideas and to report tne procedures which we discuss in
this tnesis. To determine the requirements of this
treatment, a bibliographic searcn was conducted using
available library resources. Defense Logistics Studies
Information Exchange (DLSIZ) and thesis advisors gener-
ated key points. Of particular note were the two main
information sources of written data utilized within this
thesis; the Budget Guidance Manual (NAVCOHPTIKST 7102.2A)
and the Comptroller of the Navy Manual. Additional
supporting data was ootained from various other sources
as per the bibliography.
To augment the literature review, a research field
trip to Washington D.C. (Pentagon building), more specif-
ically to the Office of Budget and Reports (03R), was
conducted in the month of February 1986. During tnis
trip numerous budget division officials and their support
budget analysts were interviewed. These inter' views
provide explanations of the linkage between tne written
policy requirements and tne reality of tne cud get
environment, in which resource allocation decisions are
made. Within the Pentagon itself, program information
searches were made by hand as well as by computer.
Success in these efforts was greatly enhanced by tne
exceptional cooperation of the Office of Budget and
Reports ( B R ) personnel.
Upon return from the field research trip, information
collected was collated and interpreted. Follow-up
telephone discussions and thesis advisor input was used
periodically for purposes of standardization. Tne
10
organization of this thesis into five chapters was
aecidecl upon for ease of incorporation into the Naval
Postgraduate School's Public Policy Processes Course
(MN3172). Each chapter, with minor outside preparation,
will be able to stand alone. Moreover the independent
reader will be able to understand part of the Department
of the Navy's (DON) budget decision making process as it
occurs within the Pentagon.
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II. BACKGROUND
This chapter outlines the following general budgetary
and decision making topics: the role that budgeting
plays in the overall management process, the different
characteristics of a budget, the environment within which
the budgeting process must be performed, the aids by.
which the complex problem of budgeting is simplified and
the interrelationship between general decision making
theory and the budgeting process.
The national defense effort has been predominantly
viewed in terms of military strategy, tactics and
hardware requirements and capabilities. However,
increasing demands being made upon this nation's limited
resources and the increased emphasis being placed upon
reducing the amount of federal spending, as reflected by
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1935 (Grarnm-Rudman-Holl ings) , is changing the manner in
which the national defense effort is being viewed. More
so now, than ever before, the decisions pertaining to
national defense are being viewed in an economic sense.
Charles Hitch and Roland McKean place this concept into
perspective by stating [Ref. 1:p. 293:
The debate about the scale of the military effort will
take place in terms of the budgets (and the
12
capabilities various budgets will buy), not in terms of
commodities (and the weapons they can produce).
Vfhen viewed from an economic point of view, national
defense can be considered to depend upon three factors
[Ref. 1:p. 4]:
- the quantity of national resources available
- the proportion of national resources allocated to
national security purposes
- the efficiency with which the resources allocated to
national security purposes are utilized.
The first economic factor (the quantity of national
resources available), which directly impacts the scale of
the national defense effort, is a concern of the highest
level of decision making in the resource allocation
process. Decisions at this level are of primary concern
to those parts of th£ government such as the Council of
Joint Economic Advisers, the President, the Congress and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The second economic factor (the proportion of
national resources allocated to national security
purposes) exists at the next level in the resource
allocation process. Decisions at this level are of
primary concern to those elements of the government such
as the Office of Management and Budget and the various
Appropriations Committees of Congress.
The third economic factor (the efficiency with which
the resources allocated to national security purposes are
utilized) is of primary concern to those elements of the
13
government such as the Department of the Defense and
subsequently the Department of the Navy.
The 'Budget of the United States Government', as
submitted by the President and approved by Congress, of
which the Department of Defense and Navy's budgets are a
subset, is the principal instrument by which national
resources are translated into specific courses of acuicn.
The degree of success by which the 3udget achieves this
purpose is dependent upon the influence of budgetary
'policy' upon the resource allocation (budgetary)
process. Russell Moore describes the importance of
'policy' upon the decision making process in the fol-
lowing manner [Ref. 2:pp. 1-493:
The principal task of policies is to give consistency
of decisions while still allowing different decisions
on different sets of facts to be made. Policies thus
furnish the framework for plans. There is consequently
a close relationship between policies and delegation of
authority
.
The word 'budget' has many different meanings and is
interpreted differently by different people. The
Department of the Navy Budget Guidance Manual
(NAVCOMPTINST 7102. 2A) defines a 'budget' as follows:
A budget is a document which expresses in financial
terms a plan for accomplishing an organization's
objectives during a specific period of time. It is an
instrument of planning, decision making and management
control. The budget is also an instrument of fiscal
policy and a statement of national priorities.
One should, after examination in more detail of the
above definition of a 'budget', quickly realize that the
14
primary purpose of a 'budget' is that of being a manage-
ment and decision making tool and much more than a mere
accounting tool by which to keep track of monetary
distributions. If viewed from a management perspective,
a 'budget' can be considered to possess certain charac-
teristics. Aaron Wildavsky outlines the various "budget'
characteristics in the following terms [Ref. 3:pp. 2-4]:
-A budget is intended behavior because funds are
approved and granted for specific reasons, spent in
accordance with instructions and expected to achieve
the purposes stated in the budget.
-A budget is a contract because Congress approves
expenditures, purposed by the President, under
specific conditions based upon a mutual understanding
between the President and Congress.
-A budget is a precedent because programs which have
been enacted are much more likely to be funded in the
future.
-A budget represents expectations because departments
predicate their requests upon certain expected events
such as the expected enactment of a particular piece
of legislation.
-A budget becomes a plan when it is coordinated to
achieve predetermined goals or objectives.
-A budget is a strategy in that the level of funding
granted to an agency is predicated upon the amount
requested by an agency attempting to allocate funds
in a manner which favorably enhances the budgetary
goals of that agency.
The budgeting process should be viewed with the
following environmental factors in mind:
-The participants in the budget decision making
process are not always clearly defined.
-It is a mixture of technical and political
influences .
15
-It is an inherently complex process.
-It occurs between parties whose relationship is a
mixture of cooperative yet conflicting interests.
The rules by which one is allowed to participate in a
particular budget decision are not always clearly defined
and understood. These participative rules are usually
well established, but not always readily apparent to the
casual observer. Michael Hobkirk describes these written
and unwritten participative rules in the following manner
[Ref. 4:p. 39]:
Participation in the decision making process does not
occur at random. There are numerous written and
unwritten rules governing how an issue may enter the
system, who can become involved, who must be consulted,
etc. The rules of the game are devices for ordering
how minds are brought to bear on a problem. An
unwritten code of ethics determines how a participant
must relate to others in the bureaucracy. This code is
constantly evolving through changes in the written
'rules, personnel and the general environment.
Budgeting is conducted in an arena which can best be
described as a curious mixture of two dichotomous
extremes. On one hand there is the purely objective
(technical) viewpoint toward budgeting. The criteria
utilized under this approach to budget decision making is
simply to choose that alternative which makes the best
economic or business sense. The rationale used in this
approach is, basically, that, as long as the numbers are
right in an economic sense, the proposed budget should go
through (be approved). The other extreme toward budget
decision making is much more subjective in nature. The
16
criteria used under this approach to budgeting is in
terms of what kind of budget will be supported and
approved by the superiors in the budget decision making
chain of command. The rationale used in this viewpoint
is that a budget which is right politically should go
through (be approved). Aaron Wildavsky describes this
curious budgeting arena in the following manner [Ref.
3:p. 1431:
Most practical budgeting may take place in a twilight
zone between politics and efficiency.
The budgeting process is an inherently complex
process. Within any large organization, particularly the
federal government, there exists an enormously large
number of items or programs, many of which possess great
technical complexities. The complexity of budgeting is
compounded by its taking place in a context in which time
is typically short; there is never enough money; people
disagree upon how to spend it, the consequences of budget
decisions are not fully known and, while the budget
decision makers have some latitude in their decision
making alternatives, their actions are influenced by
other people. In order to overcome this complexity,
budget decision makers seek to simplify their problem by





-heuristic aids to calculations
-incremental approach to budgeting
17
-the utilization of satisficing.
One method of reducing the burden of budgeting is for
the decision maker to adopt heuristic aids to budget
calculations. Decision makers make small budget changes,
observe the impact of those changes, and allow feedback
to determine the impact of their budget decisions. An
example would be the implementation of across-the-board
cuts and the simple reliance upon feedback from their
constituency to inform the budgeteers of the conse-
quences of such decisions.
Another method by which budget decision makers see
to reduce the complexity of budgeting is to institute
incremental budgeting. VJhen utilizing an incremental
approach to budgeting, budget decision makers do not
review the budget as a whole. Under this concept the
prospective budget is based upon the previous year's
budget with major emphasis given to marginal decreases
or increases. The budget decision maker can consequently
concentrate his efforts upon a relatively narrow margin
of the overall budget. Paramount to the concepts of
incremental budgeting is stability in the base budget.
It is stability which gives incremental budgeting
application and usefulness in the budgeting arena. The
rationale, upon which the base budget is predicated, is
seldom questioned and, if changed, is not changed
lightly. Agencies, under incremental budgeting, can
18
count upon receiving a level of funding similar to the
amount they received the previous year. The amount
which they expect to receive under incremental
.
budgeting
greatly outweighs the amount which is left open to
debate and scrutiny.
Another method by which budgeteers attempt to reduce
the complexity of the budgeting process is to ' satis-
fice'. Budget officials often do not try to maximize
when making a budget decision but satisfice (satisfy and
suffice). To reduce the complexity, budgeteers often
reduce their goals or sights. They establish minimum
levels of expectations for the proposed budget and when
the budget meets this minimum desired level of perfor-
mance, they cease seeking the optimal budget decision.
The budgeting process is conducted between parties
whose relationship is a mixture of cooperative yet often
conflicting interests. Central to this concept is the
differing roles played in the budgeting process by the
advocates (agency) and the guardians (budget review
personnel) of the budget. The agency is expected to
provide the guardians a choice of items from which
budget reductions (cuts) may be made. The guardians are
expected to provide the advocates budgetary limits
within which to make budget decisions. Both roles are
intertwined and dependent upon trust and confidence to
succeed. Without trust, the communication between the
19
two parties breaks down, resulting in the agency either
asking for too much (leaving money idle) or too little
(requiring supplemental requests at a .later time).
Without trust, guardians impose stricter controls, which
leads to the advocates engaging in deception, which in
turn leads to even more increased controls by the
guardians. Consequently, no one in the budgeting
process can count on anyone. In this vicious cycle,
everyone disregards the original budget.
As evidenced thus far, one important underlying theme
pervading the discussion of budgets is that budgeting is
principally a decision making process. Let us, for the
moment, divert our attention from budgeting itself and
concentrate our efforts upon gaining a better under-
standing of general decision making theory and how it-
relates to the budgetary process. Efraim Turban and
Jack Meredith define 'decision making' as follows [Ref.
6:p. 4]:
Decision making is a process by which one chooses
between two or more available alternative courses of
action for the purpose of attaining a goal.
When comparing the definitions of a 'budget' and
'decision making', as previously given, it becomes
obviously clear that the objective of each is to pursue
a plan or a course among alternatives to achieve an
organization's goals. Decision making is, thusly, an
integral and inseparable part of the budgeting process.
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Budgeting is, therefore, nothing more than a specialized
type of decision making.
Decision making may be viewed from basically two
perspectives:
- decision making under normal circumstances
- decision making under stress or crisis
Decision making under normal circumstances is
compromised of the following steps:
- defining the problem
- searching for alternative courses of action
- evaluating the alternatives
- selecting one alternative
- implementation of the alternative
- evaluation (later) of the alternative.
When viewed in the context of budgeting, the steps
to decision making under normal circumstances can be
thought of in the following manner:
- Defining the problem, to the budgeteer, means
obtaining an understanding of the relative impor-
tance of the various items in the budget to the
other elements contained in the budget.
- Searching for alternative courses of action involves
the formulation of different resource allocation
proposals for consideration.
- Evaluating the alternatives means determining the
advantages and disadvantages of each resource
allocation proposal and their impact upon the
other activities performed by the agency.
- Selecting an alternative implies an attempt to
choose the 'best' course of action which, in budget
terms, often means choosing that alternative with the
least disadvantages.
21
- Implementation of the alternative means enacting the
resource allocation proposal by promulgating it as
part of the formal budget.
- Evaluating (later) the alternative requires the
comparison of actual results or effects obtained
by the chosen alternative against the desired or
planned results.
The decision making process during the normal
circumstances above yields the best results only when
applied to a single situation or problem at a time.
Under normal circumstances, if the decision maker
encounters several problems, they should be viewed
simply as a series of individual problems and solved by
applying the steps outlined above in a sequential manner
The steps to decision making under normal circum-
stances establishes the framework for understanding the
decision making process. Much of the budgetary decision
making, however, occurs during periods of stress,
thereby making it encumbent upon the budgeteer to
recognize and understand stress and its impact upon the
budgetary process.
The negative impact of stress or crisis upon the
decision making process is easily observed and evidenced
by the following characteristics:
- outcome is uncertain
- simultaneous multiple problems
- changing goals or objectives
- change in organizational structure
22
- change in lines of communication
- .short time constraints
- increased workload
- sense of anxiety, fear or panic.
The ultimate result of stress is that the decision
maker is placed into an uncomfortable state of disequi-
librium. Once placed in this situation the decision
maker attempts to regain a natural state of equilibrium
in which he is more comfortable. James Cribbin describes
this adjustment process as follows [Ref. 7:pp. 204-2051:
ongoing behavior is blocked
manager is placed into a state
of disequilibrium
I
various ways 'to overcome the thwarting
situation are tried
I
tension-reducing response is discovered
/ \
adaptive behavior
resolves disequilibrium short term" reduction
and need satisfaction, but
no lasting solution
maladaptive behavior
As indicated above, the behavior which a decision
maker could adopt in an effort to regain a state of
equilibrium may take the form of either adaptive or
maladaptive behavior. Adaptive behavior, in the budget-
ary sense, primarily consists of the budgeteer seeking
23
out the latest and most accurate information from all
available sources (superiors, field activities, peers,
etc.) to reestablish an updated data base from which to
predicate new decisions. James Cribbin describes the
forms which maladaptive behavior may take as follows
[Ref. 7:p. 205]:
- recourse to aggression
- withdrawal (from people or problems)
- deception (to save face and maintain respect).
It becomes obviously clear that the appropriate
course of behavior which a budgeteer should adopt is
along the lines of adaptive behavior, from which long
lasting and more permanent solutions may be realized,
versus maladaptive behavior which yields only short
lived relief from the crisis situation.
Highlighted within this chapter have been the
following major concepts; a budget is nothing more than
specialized decision making, a budget is principally a
management tool and much more than a mere accounting
device, and the budgeting process is greatly influenced
by policy established by higher authority.
In the next chapter we will examine; the external
and internal organizational relationships of the Comp-
troller of the Navy (MAVCOMPT), the functions performed
by MAVCOMPT in support of the overall Navy organization,
24
and the responsibilities fulfilled by the sub-units
within NAVCOMPT.
25
III. THE COMPTROLLER OF THE MAVY (NAVCOMPT) .
Before we approach the Navy Budget Office (UBO)
itself, we should first gain some understanding of the
responsibilities and organization of the Comptroller of
the Wavy (NAVCOMPT). This chapter outlines the following
issues and topics peculiar to NAVCOMPT; the external and
internal organizational relationships of MAVCOMPT, the
functions performed by NAVCOMPT in support of the
overall Mavy organization, and the responsibilities
fulfilled by the sub-units within NAVCOMPT.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial
Management, ASN(FM), is additionally assigned the
responsibility of fulfilling the duties as the Comptrol-
ler of the Navy. It should be noted that the position
of ASN(FM) is an internal Department of the Navy (DON)
organizational prerogative of the Secretary of the Navy
(SECNAV), while the position of the Comptroller
(NAVCOMPT) is required by Congressional statute.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Navy was
established by SECNAV on 1 June 1950 in accordance with
the provisions of Title IV of the National Security Act
Amendments of 1949. Since its inception, the broad
mission assigned to NAVCOMPT has been to establish and
implement principles, policies, procedures and systems
26
which would ensure the effective control over all
financial matters within the DOM. Table One depicts the
external organizational relationship between the Comp-
troller of the Navy and the overall Department of the
Navy structure.
TABLE ONE
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As the fiscal/financial arm of SECNAV, the Comp-
troller was delegated responsibility for performing the






- management information systems
- financial assistance to defense contractors
- administrative organization structure and manageri-
al procedures related to such responsibilities
within the DON.
As one can quickly gather, the Comptroller is,
indeed, responsible for all financially related matters
within the Department of the Navy (DON). The Budget
Guidance Manual (NAVCOMPTINST 7102. 2A) states, "That the
budget functions of the Comptroller of the Navy occur
during all phases of the budget cycle, including formula-
tion, presentation, and execution."
The Comptroller of the Navy is assisted in fulfilling
his financial responsibilities by the following sub-
units whose organizational relationship to NAVCOMPT is
depicted in Table Two below:
- Deputy Comptroller
- Assistant Comptroller, Financial Management Systems
- Director of Budget and Reports (NCB).
28
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COMPTROLLER OF THE NAVY
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DEPUTY COMPTROLLER. The Deputy Comptroller provides
assistance, as directed, to NAVCOMPT and in the absence
of the Comptroller, functions in his behalf. Specific
daily duties of the Deputy Comptroller include the
supervision and management of the Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Navy and related field activities.
ASSISTANT COMPTROLLER, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS.
The Assistant Comptroller of Financial Management
Systems provides assistance to the Comptroller by
formulating policies and procedures to be utilized in
the implementation of financial management systems which
are designed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency
of the financial efforts throughout the DON. Other
selected functions performed by the Assistant Comptroller
of Financial Management Systems on behalf of NAVCOMPT
are listed as follows [Ref. 9:pp. 1.43-45]:
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- evaluates and approves financial management systems
for both appropriated and nonappropriated funds
throughout .the DOM
- maintains the DON Five Year Defense Program
- oversees the DON Internal Review Program
- appraises the effectiveness of new and existing
DON financial management systems; identifies adverse
conditions and recommends corrective action for
financial management problems throughout the DON.
The above list of selected functions performed by
the Assistant Comptroller of Financial Management
Systems is by no means a complete listing and the reader
is referred to the NAVCOMPT Manual, Volume One for a
more complete listing.
DIRECTOR OF BUDGET AND REPORTS. The preponderance
of the budgeting responsibilities (at the secretarial
level) assigned to NAVCOMPT are performed by the Office
of 3udget and Reports (OBR), which is supervised by the
Director of Budget and Reports (NC3). The following is
a list of selected functions assigned to the Director of
Budget and Reports (NCB) [Ref. 9:pp. 1.41-431:
- acts as the principal point of contact for outside
agencies and other military department budget
offices in all DON budgetary matters
- establishes the general principles, policies and
procedures which govern the preparation, presenta-
tion and administration of the DON budget
- establishes the appropriation structure which
provides the framework for the preparation and
subsequent justification of the Navy budget
- directs the analysis and review of budget estimates
of the DON and the presentation of the budget to
30
the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), the Office cf
Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congress
- exercises fiduciary control at the DON level
- issues policies and guidance on reprogramming of
approved funds.
The above list of selected functions performed by
the Director of Budget and Reports (IICB) is by no means
a complete listing and the reader is referred to the
NAVCOMPT Manual, Volume One for a more complete listing.
In addition to functioning for the Secretary of the
Navy (SECNAV) as the supervisor of the Office of Budget
and Reports (OBR), the Director of Budget and Reports
QC3) functions in a dual capacity (dual hatted) to the
Chief of f!aval Operations (CMO) as the Director of the
Fiscal Management Division (OP-92). Table Three outlines
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The duties and responsibilities of the Director of
the Fiscal Management Division (OP-92), within the
Office of the CMO, are delineated in the OPNAV Organiza-
tional Manual (OPMAVINST 5430.48). The overall mission
assigned to OP-92 is the development and implementation
of a financial management and comptrollership system to
ensure the effective management control of funds and
resources assigned to the CNO. Selected functions
performed by OP-92 on behalf of the CNO are listed as
follows [Ref. 10:pp. F2-4]:
- formulates the budget for the CNO
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- supervises the preparation, analysis and review of
the budget estimates for the CIJO
- prepares apportionment requests for the CIO and
allocates funds as appropriate
- reviews rates of obligation and expenditure of
appropriated funds and exercises budget control
for those appropriations assigned to the CilO
- acts as the primary point of contact for the CNO's
financial management program
- functions as the CNO's liaison with the various
Congressional Appropriation Committees
- acts as the responsible officer for the appropria-
tion accounts assigned to the CNO.
The above list of selected functions performed by
the Director of Budget and Reports (NCB) in the role as
OP-92, on behalf of the CNO, is by no means a complete
listing and the reader is referred to the OPNAVINST
5430.48 (Organizational Manual) for a more complete
listing.
Of the responsibilities assigned to the Comptroller
of the Navy (outlined earlier in this chapter), it is
upon the 'budgeting' function and the associated decision
making process that the remainder of this paper will
focus its attention. The activities performed by
MAVCOMPT during the DON budgeting process can be subdi-
vided into three basic phases; formulation (including
guidance and budget review), presentation and execution.
Let us now examine the first phase of the DOM budget
process, that of formulation.
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FORMULATION. The Comptroller is responsible for
establishing department-wide policies and procedures to
be utilized within the DOM during the budget formulation
process. Preceding the formal budget formulation
process, NAVCOMPT provides assistance to the Chief of
'laval Operations (CMO) and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps (CMC) in the preparation of the DON Program
Objectives Memorandum (POM). The POM items will later
formulate the basis from which the DOM budget will be
prepared
.
The Office of Budget and Reports (OBR), on behalf of
the Comptroller, provides substantive and technical
direction applicable to all phases of the budget formula-
tion process. The budget guidance promulgated by the
Office of Budget and Report (OBR) is a composite of the
requirements from several sources; the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (0M3) circulars, policy guidance from
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Secretary of the
Navy (SECMAV), and various other directions received
from the Congress.
An important aspect of the budget formulation
process is the 'budget review' conducted by the OBR, or.
behalf of the Comptroller, of the budget estimates
submitted by the various commands throughout the DOM.
The OBR reviews the budget estimates to ensure that they
reflect SECNAV's policy decisions. After the budget
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estimates are reviewed, the OBR prepares the formal DON
budget for submission to the SECDEF for OSD review. The
review of the DOM budget by OSD is conducted in conjunc-
tion with OBR staff analysts. The OBR budget personnel
subsequently provide guidance to the various DON compo-
nents for the preparation of reclamas to the proposed
OSD budget decisions.
PRESENTATION. After its approval by SECNAV, the
Comptroller presents the DON budget estimates to the
OSD, as indicated above, and OMB. The Comptroller is
responsible, after the President's budget is submitted
to Congress, for presenting the DON portion of that
budget before the various appropriation committees (I-! AC
and SAC) and for providing any additional information
requested by Congress on all DOM budgetary and financial
matters.
EXECUTION. Once Congress has approved the Presi-
dent's budget, the Comptroller reviews apportionment
requests from the various DOM commands and prepares an
apportionment plan for submission and approval by OMB
via OSD. The apportionment requests are reviewed by OMB
and OSD examiners who schedule apportionment hearings as
required. NAVCOMPT staff members and cognizant program
officials participate in the hearings. After OMB
reviews and approves the apportionment plan, the Compt-
roller allocates the apportioned funds to the respective
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responsible offices and, thereafter, continuously
reviews their budget execution performance against the
approved budget plan. If the budget execution perfor-
mance review yields a deviation from the budget plan,
NAVCOMPT implements appropriate budget readjustments
through revised allocations to the responsible offices.
Table Four depicts the overall apportionment and alloca-
tion process applicable to the Department of the Navy
(DON). The apportionment and allocation process is
designed to prevent the occurrence of funding deficien-
cies or excesses, especially in the annual accounts,
through the control of the quarterly obligational rates.
Highlighted within this chapter have been the
following central issues and concepts: the Comptroller
of the Navy (NAVCOMPT), acting on behalf of the Secre-
tary of the Navy (SECNAV), is responsible for all
financially related matters (including budgeting) within
the Department of the Navy (DON); the Director of Budget
and Reports (MC3), acting on behalf of NAVCOMPT, is
responsible for the control, formulation, presentation
and execution of the overall DON budget; the Director of
Budget and Reports (NC3) functions additionally in a
dual reporting capacity as the Director of the Fiscal
Management Division (OP-92); the functions performed by
NC3/0P-92, on behalf of the SECNAV, are performed under
the auspices of NC3 and the functions performed by
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NCB/OP-92, on behalf of the Chief of Naval Operations
(CIIO), are performed under the auspices of OP- 92; and
that the lines of responsibilities between NCE and QP-92
often overlap and occur simultaneously.
Within the next chapter we will investigate the
internal organization of the Office of Budget and
Reports (03R), the responsibilities of the various
sections within the 03R, the dual reporting responsibili-
ties of the Director of the Office of Budget and Reports
( NCB)/Director of Fiscal Management Division (OP-92) and
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IV. THE OFFICE: OF BUDGET AMD REPORTS
In this chapter, we will explore the following issues
and concepts pertinent to the operations of the Office of
Budget and Reports (03R): the internal organization of
the Office of Budget and Reports (03R); how the structure
is set up and how it interacts with its parts; an
overview of the decision making process from the perspec-
tive of the Office of Budget and Reports (03R) is
discussed and sectional responsibilities are listed and
related to this process; and finally the coordinated
responsibilities performed under the auspices of the
Director of Budget and Reports (MCB) and the Director of
the Fiscal Management Division (OP-92) are interrelated.
The orientation of this chapter is toward the review
of substantive guidance and technical direction provided
by the 03R during the Department of the Navy (DON)
budgetary cycle.
The Director of Budget and Reports (MC3) is responsi-
ble for the internal management (at the secretarial
level) of the overall DON budget. This position, as
described in Chapter Three, is a dual reporting (dual-
hatted) responsibility, the other role being that of the
Director of Fiscal Management Division (OP-92) which is,
principally, the budget execution arm of the Chief of
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Naval Operations (CNO). While serving as the budget
officer, on behalf of the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV),
he is functioning as NCB and while serving as the budget
execution officer; on behalf of the CNO, he is function-
ing as OP-92. Table Five depicts the organizational
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The budget management process is most easily divided
at this point to obtain a better understanding of the
budgetary decision making process. First, it must be
realized that the dual role (NCB/OP-92) makes the budget
management relationships complex in that, as NCB, the
budget management is that of a secretarial level review
which encompasses all budgetary matters within the
Department of the Navy and the Department of the Marine
Corps. Such a budgetary relationship results, inherent-
ly, in an overlapping and simultaneous performance of
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budgetary responsibilities, on behalf of the SECNAV and
CNO, by NCB/OP-92. It is upon the policy and substantive
review (secretarial level review) performed by NCB, on
behalf of the SECMAV, that the remainder of this paper
will devote its attention.
A substantial portion of the budget 'formulation'
phase of the DON budget cycle involves a review by NCB
of each submitting activities' budget estimates. The
budget estimates reflect a statement of managerial
objectives and priorities, as determined by the various
submitting offices. NC3 reviews the submitted budget
estimates to determine where and to what extent these
objectives and priorities can be incorporated into the
overall DOIJ budget. Of primary importance is the
determination by NCB of a program's ' executabil ity ' .
Virtually all of the Navy Budget Office (N30) personnel
interviewed during the course of this study emphasized
the importance of a program's financial executabil ity
during the review of the submitted budget estimates,
particularly prior to the secretarial level review.
Executabil ity may mean different things to different
people. Here, the term executabil ity means that the
program (whichever it may be) can be executed or carried
out as planned during the budget year. Fixed and cost
reimbursement contracts per program are reviewed and end
item support phasing is determined to be achievable or
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infeasible. To determine executabil i ty , a program's
prior and current year budget execution performance is
reviev/ed along with the lead time requirements for the
production or support of end items, pricing levels and
program schedule timing. The preliminary determination
of a program's executabil ity is the responsibility of
the submitting office. Hov/ever, a careful review by .'.'30
analysts is required to identify potential funding
excesses (which could be redirected into funding for
other programs such as those identified as 'unfunded
requirements') and deficiencies (which would later
require supplemental funding).
The collation and synthesis of the various submitting
offices' budget estimates into an overall DOii budget
plan for submission to the Secretary of Defense is
performed by the different divisions within the Office
of Budget and Reports (OBR). A description of the
divisions within the OBR and the functions which they
perform is outlined below. Table Six depicts the
internal organizational relationships of the various
divisions within the OBR.
Three divisions (NC3-1, MC3-2, and NCB-6), within
the OBR, comprise the 'Budget Review Divisions' which
are primarily responsible for making the preliminary
resource allocation (budgetary) decisions. The Budget
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These offices are also responsible for preparing or
clearing budget material provided to Congress in
support of DO.'I appropriations. This material includes
budget justification material, statements, transcripts
of hearings, answers to questions, and backup or
supporting papers.
Budget personnel from the Budget Review Divisions are
additionally assigned the responsibilities of attending
the various Congressional committee hearings in the role
of supporting witnesses. Table Seven below depicts the
amount of funding controlled by the two
TABLE SEVEN
"OFFICE OF BUDGET AND REPORTS FUNDING CONTROL"
Fiscal Year 1935 - Budget Authority (Millions)




























Notes: (1) Includes Civilian ManDower figures
(NC3-6)
(2) Based upon Total Obligation figures
primary departments within the 'Budget Review Divisions',
that of the 'Operations Division' (NC3-1) and the
'Investment and Development Division' (NCB-2).
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In summary, the '3udget Review Divisions' determine,
within the guidelines of control at their level, how
finalized and scarce resources are allocated within trie
Department of the Navy (DON).
The remaining divisions (NCB-3, NCB-5, and NCBG)
perform various staff and support functions, in support
of the overall DON budgetary process. These staff
and support functions include, but are not limited to,
the following:
- controls of the DON budgetary process
- issues programmatic policy and budgetary guidance
- initiates the DON budget cycle through their issuance
of the 'budget call'
- issues budget schedules and formats for preparation
of the DOM budget estimates
- resolves appropriation conflicts between the various
03 R divisions
- maintains the DOIJ appropriation structure
- ensures the reflection of audit findings into the
overall DOM budget
- creates applicable budgetary finding documents and
financial reports
- disseminates DON budgetary related statistical data.
NCB-1: OPERATIONS DIVISION. As trie 'Operations
Division', NCB-1 is responsible for the budget formula-
tion of the military personnel and operations/maintenance
efforts within the DON. The Operations Division is
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responsible for the budget administration of the
following appropriation accounts [Ref. 11:pp. 1-12]:
HPM Military Personnel, Navy
MPMC Military Personnel, Marine Corps
RPN Reserve Personnel, Navy
RPMC Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps
OMN Operations and Maintenance, Navy
OilMC Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps
OMNR Operations and Maintenance, Navy Reserve
OMMCR Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps
Reserve
NSF Navy Stock Fund
MCSF Marine Corps Stock Fund
NIF Navy Industrial Fund
MCIF Marine Corps Industrial Fund
Markups are influenced and changed, not only by
cognizant personnel within the various divisions, but,
also, by the Program Decision Memorandums (PDM) adjust-
ments, Congressional actions or Congressional reactions,
Chief of Naval Operations/Commandant of the Marine Corps
or Secretary of the Navy. Very often the new pricing
guidance changes become common interdictions at this
point .
NCB-2: INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT DECISION. As the
'Investment and Development Division', NC3-2 is responsi-
ble for the budget formulation of the long term DON
46
investment and development efforts. The Investment and
Development Division is responsible for the budget
administration of the following appropriation accounts
[Ref. 1 1
: pp. 1-12]:
APN Aircraft Procurement, Navy
SCN Shipbuilding & Conversion, Navy
WPM Weapons Procurement, Navy
OPN Other Procurement, Navy
PMC Procurement, Marine Corps
RDTccE Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
MCN Military Construction, Navy
MCNR Military Construction, Navy Reserve
FHjN/MC— Family Housing, Navy & Marine Corps
This division conducts a preponderence of its
markups, follow-up actions, reviews and responsibilities,
in essentially, the same manner as NC3-1, as described
above. NC3-2, as well as NC3-1 , assists the SECNAV in
the justification of various budget inputs and their
subsequent markups before Congressional committees, the
OSD, and the OMB, as it is found necessary. Specific
data that is requested by Congress is also prepared by
NC3-2 and NC3-1 . Examples, such as, specifically
selected costs of acquisition are most prominent and any
time that Congress would require more data, these
divisions assist in the preparation of such data. A
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greater tendency (particularly by NCB-2) is to conduct
examinations for 'phasing' or checking for requirements
of the end product and cutting or reassigning assets if
not required until the following year. Here, unobligated
balances, which will be looked at later in this paper,
are some of those procurement anomalities which hit very
hard at the NCB-2 division and make the monetary distri-
bution more difficult to justify to the responsible
committees.
NCB-3: FINANCIAL CONTROL DIVISION. As defined in
the Budget Guidance Manual (NAVCOMPTINST 7102. 2A)
,
this
division administers the "financial control systems,
procedures for the apportionment and subsequent alloca-
tion of funds and resources, and the reprogramming
process". Here the creation of the funding documents is
performed and the financial reports are prepared.
General Accounting Office reviews, surveys and reports
are coordinated by this division. The enhancement of
available resources by the 'correctness' of controls and
the proper application of these correct controls is
managed carefully in this division.
NCB—4 . It should be noted that, through past organi-
zational consolidations within MAVCOMPT and the OBR,
this division no longer exists within the organizational
structure of the Office of Budget and Reports (OBR).
4n
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NCB-5: BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT POLICY AND PROCEDURES
DIVISION. The divisional responsibilities and authority
of NC3-5 are more widely dispersed and oriented toward
maintaining a 'big picture' perspective than the other
divisions within the OBR. After, and often during, the
budget review process, conflicting issues concerning
appropriation related matters often surface which
individual divisions within the OBR can not resolve.
Such conflicts often involve the determination and
establishment of policies pertaining to funding response
bilities (who within the DON is going to pay for it).
NCB-5 makes a determination of the appropriate lines of
responsibility and issues resolutions to such conflict
situations .
During the internal DON budgeting process, the
necessity to transfer funding responsibility from one
appropriation to another occasionally occurs. NCB-5
analysts are responsible for reviewing such issues and
making recommendations regarding 'appropriation policy'
to the OBR divisions experiencing difficulty resolving
such conflicts.
The development and administration of Navy audit
management procedures, pertaining to the budgeting
function, as well as their evaluation of and their
financial impact upon the Department of the Navy (DON)
budget are controlled by NCB-5. This may be
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characterized by "What you can spend" and " T..rho is
responsible for spending it". NCB-5 creates some of the
ground rules for budget formulation. NC3-5 will advise
the Budget Review Divisions by suggesting marks which are
based on audit reports which are originated by three
basic organizations:
- Government Accounting Office (GAO)
- Department of Defense (DOD)
- Department of the Navy (DON).
The importance of this is that it gives the various
analysts in the appropriate divisional structures a good
feeling for as well as the fuel for making early,
correct, and organized decisions for the preparation of
the information in their respective areas.
The recommendations contained in various audit
reports are often overlooked by the submitting offices
and, consequently, are closely examined by NCB-5 ana-
lysts. Audit report findings are required to be re-
flected in the budget estimates proposed by the submit-
ting offices. These audit results are submitted in the
form of an exhibit which is turned into the system.
This statement of audit savings is passed to NCB-5
immediately and then used in the formulation of the DON
budget.
NCB-6: CIVILIAN MANPOWER DIVISION. The 'Civilian
Manpower Division' performs, in a congruent fashion, the
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same basic functions as NCB-1 and NCB-2 except that this
division is responsible for a different area of budget
management within the Office of Budget and Reports (OBR).
The Civilian Manpower Division prepares the mark up
and final budget estimates for civilian manpower through-
out the DON. This centralized budget decision making
capability is required because civilian manpower crosses
many lines of control (civilians are in all facets of
the DON) . NCB-6 is responsible for the inclusion of the
civilian budget estimates into the overall DOM budget
and for the subsequent justification of these estimates
before the Office of the Secretary of Defense (05D), the
Office of Management and 3udget (OMB) and Congress, much
the same as the justifications presented by NCB-1 and
NCB-2 for their respective appropriation accounts.
NCBG: BUDGET EVALUATION GROUP. This division
serves as the 'quick reaction' choke point for the
internal management of crisis (short fused) budgetary
issues (within the 03R) . This 'crisis coordination' is
required to ensure the timely collation and synthesis of
all DON budget issues which require quick response and
resolution. To properly accomplish this immense task
MCBG is assigned the responsibility for the DON budget
guidance and control. NCBG evaluates the effectiveness
of the budgetary controls, within the Department of the
Navy (DON), and is responsible for coordinating budgetary
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decisions made by Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD)
.
Budgeting schedules and formats are established for
guidance and control, and proper operation is overseen
as closely as time constraints allow. Budget control
numbers (final) are maintained for both DON appropria-
tions and individual appropriations. Because the volume
of information is cyclical and time critical as well as
massive in its quantity, a valuable interface with the
automatic data processing system (ADP) is also coordi-
nated by iJCBG. This division closely follows the review
process to ensure the timely function of the ADP system
and the tracking of the various appropriations as
necessary .
MCBG is the office that puts out the 'budget call'
to the major claimants (submitting activities) and
schedules the requirement dates for responses from those
submitting activities.
The budgetary decision making process continually
overlaps and cuts across divisional lines of responsibil-
ity within the OBR. IJCBG is responsible for the coordi-
nation of the overall budgeting efforts of the various
divisions of the 03R. Budget coordination by iJCBG is
essential to the development of a 'consistent' budget
plan because of the decentralized budgetary decision
making process utilized within the DON. The synthesis
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of this cross movement requires sensitive coordination
by NCBG and it is here that one may observe the earliest
parts of the DON'S budget structure formulated and
synthesized.
Congress requires that the Department of Defense
(DOD) budget, of which the DON budget is a subset, be
structured according to appropriation accounts. NCBG is
responsible for managing the appropriation structure
within the DON.
The organizational structure, within the 03R, that
has oeen presented thus far is the one which is written,
in the majority of usage, and well adhered to in tne
internal management of the budget process within the DOM.
Highlighted within this chapter have been the
following issues and concepts pertinent to the internal
structure and decision making processes within the
Office of Budget and Reports (OBR): the budget review
divisions (NC3-1, 2 and 6) review of the budget estimates
for all the appropriation accounts within the Department
of the Navy (DON) and the other divisions within the
Office of 3udget and Reports (NC3-3, NC3-5 and NC3-6)
performs support functions dealing with budget control,
policy formulation and reporting.
This leads us into the next chapter where we will
discuss the decision making process within the Office of
Budget and Reports (OBR) and the various influences
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which impact upon it. As we will reveal, in the follow-
ing chapter, the political situations that budgeting
create will proliferate changes in the way 'business' is
done and cause constant variations in the decision rules
used to conduct that business. The budget decision
making procedures to support the budget structure are
revealed to be more flexible and subjective at the
higher levels of decision making within the MBO than at
the lower levels which principally concern their review-
to analysis and fact gathering of budget estimates. 'Je
will also examine the broad provisions of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Control Act of 1935 (Gramm-Fludman-
Hollings), its impact upon the Department of the .'iavy's
(DOM) budget and its implications from a budget decision
making perspective.
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V. DECISION MAKING -JITHIi: THE NAVY BUDGET OFFICE:
Within this chapter we will investigate from the
perspective of the office of Budget and Reports (OBR),
the following subjects; the major issues (from a macro
point of view) which directly impact upon budgetary
decision making within the 03R) , the political and
technical considerations which influence how budget
decisions are made within the OBR, and the budgetary
decision making process as it exists within the Navy
Budget Office (HBO).
Let us begin by exploring (from a macro point of
view) some of the broad yet basic resource allocation
issues which directly or indirectly impact upon budget
decisions within the Office of Budget and Reports(OBR)
.
SIX HUNDRED SHIP NAVY. One principal factor which
affects budget decisions within the Department of the
Navy (DON), from a macro perspective, is the Secretary
of the Navy's (SECNAV's) stated objective of establishing
and maintaining a six hundred ship navy with global
capabilities. As has been readily admitted by a Navy
budget official, there is 'nothing special' about the
magic number six hundred, except that it drives practi-
cally all other budget decisions within the DON. Along
with this somewhat arbitrary number (six hundred) comes
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the associated budgeting and funding considerations:
determining what types and amounts of
m
additional hardware
(ships, aircraft and related support equipment) and
additional manpower that must be procured or supported
in order to obtain the projected growth; determining
the rate (schedule) at which such hardware can be
realistically expected to materialize; budgeting and
coordinating the required funding in concert with the
projected production schedule; and determining the most
efficient manner (multi year contracting, off the shelf
purchasing, competitive bidding, etc.) in which to
procure the needed hardware. To place the importance of
the six hundred ship objective and its budgeting impact
into perspective, a Navy budget official relates:
The six hundred ship goal drives other resource
allocation decisions made within the Department of the
Navy. Once you have reached a six hundred ship Uavy,
you have to purchase approximately 20 ships and
anywhere between 275 and 300 aircraft annually just
to maintain that goal. Anything less than this, you
will gradually shrink the overall size of the .'Javy's
forces
.
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEFS' DILEMMA. Another issue which
impacts resource allocation decisions, which the highest
levels of the budgetary decision making chain of command
within the Department of the Navy (DOI-J) must address,
pertains to the degree of centralization or decentraliza-
tion which the DON budget decision making process should
be allowed to possess. Recent emphasis has been placed,
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by some individuals within the federal government, upon
decentralizing the resource allocation process and
placing more authority for making budgetary decisions
further down the resource allocation chain of command.
Within the DON this emphasis is reflected by the 'CI'.'C's
dilemma'. Or. the one hand, the Commander-in-Chiefs are
the individuals who possess the most" detailed know ledge
of the resources required to operate and meet the
operational needs of their theaters of operations. Yet,
on the other hand, a Cli.'C, almost by definition, is not
a person with the broad picture of the overall resource
allocation requirements on a departmental basis. It is
proposed, by the proponents of the centralized approach
to resource allocation, that more CINC control of budget
decision making would fragment the resource allocation
process and introduce more political infighting that has
been experienced before. Synonymous with the decentral-
ized approach to resource allocation is the ' ricebowl
theory'. The principal thrust of this theory is that a
lot of people possess the perception that money and
power are equivalent. This basic premise can be ex-
pressed as follows, "If my command gets more money, my
command is better off and the person who gets that
additional money is more powerful than his predecessor".
Somewhat in conjunction with the 'ricebowl theory' is
the 'not invented here syndrome'. The 'not invented
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here syndrome' is more partisan in nature, reflecting
the viewpoint of resource allocation decision making
held by some budgeteers, that, "If I did not think of
it, it obviously has to be wrong and I'm not going to
support it". Both the 'ricebowl theory' and the 'not
invented here syndrome' are indicative of a more local-
ized perspective of the resource allocation process and
tend to 'unfocus' the budgeting efforts realized through
a more centralized resource allocation (budget) process.
The issue of how much centralization or decentralization
(CINC's dilemma) that the Department of the Navy's (DON)
budgetary process will be allowed to possess will
obviously have to be addressed and resolved at only the
highest levels within the DON resource allocation
decision making chain of command.
FULL VERSUS PARTIAL FUNDING. Another principal
budget decision making factor, which must be addressed
by budgeteers within the Navy Budget Office (N20), is
whether to fully or partially fund a particular program
or item. There is increasing pressure from some members
of Congress to have the Department of Defense (DOD)
estimate the 'total' cost of a program or item, especial-
ly those within the procurement appropriation accounts,
and to have the 'total' costs reflected in the DOD and
DON budget estimates. Fully funded programs project
budget estimates in excess of that funding expected to
be expended during the budget year, which gives rise to
the perceived under utilization of resources (unobligated
balances). These unobligated balances become the target
of prey for other program officials seeking support
(funding) for their programs. Partial funding reflects
budget estimates in tune with the level of funding which
can realistically be expected to be expended during the
respective budget year. The program funding for various
procured assets is a 'living' non-static thing which,
starting with the Concept Evaluation Phase where the
functional baseline is created for an Operational
Requirement (OR) or a Justification for Major System Mew
Start (JMSNS), is not decided until several years into
the future. Full funding, in effect, requires military
planners to commit to specific programs or equipment
purchases years in advance of their actual production
.and procurement. As a result, flexibility to respond to
changes in operational requirements is reduced. Congress
has in a sense shifted some of the military strategy
decision making responsibility from the Department of
Defense (DOD) onto itself. As a Navy budget official
stated
:
Should Congress perform military strategy and decision
making? I should not think so. We must take and
separate politics from the reality of military
planning .
One can quickly see the budgeting conflict within
which DOD and DON budgeteers are caught. On the one
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hand, there is increasing pressure by Congress to
'fully fund*. On the other hand, there is a need,
on the part of budgeteers, to 'partially fund' in
order to protect present funding levels and to maintain
flexibility in the resource allocation decision making
process
.
PREPOSITIONING OF RESOURCES. Another resource
allocation (budget) decision making issue, which DOD and
DOM budgeteers must address themselves, is the issue
concerning the preposi tioning of resources into foreign
theaters. The preposi tion ing of resources into potential
future theaters of conflict has its obvious advantages.
The predominate advantage of ' preposi ticning ' is the
tremendous cost savings which could be realized by
transporting resources, in bulk by sh»ip, and storing
these resources in the 'hotspot' theaters versus air-
lifting (more expensive) supplies into the 'hotspots'
upon the advent of a future conflict. The preposi tioning
of resources is not without its disadvantages. 3uch
resources have, in the past, typically proven to be
unkept and unready for deployment when needed. The
preposi tioning of resources require adequate and usually
costly storage facilities to maintain them in an appro-
priate condition. There is increasing pressure, by some
members of Congress, to require the host country to bear
the burden of providing the required storage facilities.
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The degree to which host countries comply with this
desire of Congress, directly impacts defense related
budget decisions. The degree to which foreign countries
fund the storage of preposi tioned resources serves as a
baseline from which DOD and DON funding requirements for
the preposi tioning of resources is determined. Other
difficulties encountered with the prepositioning of
resources include the following; pilferage by our own
forces, storage facilities are often in lesser developed
and secure areas, therefore, making the resources
susceptible to the effects of a black market (theft) and
to acts of terrorism. An example concerns the preposi-
tioning of hospital medical 'vans' which are container-
ized surgery and battle care stations to be us„ed during
future conflicts. Some host countries will not allow
the prepositioning of such units into their country
because of their inability to prevent pilferage and
theft. As a result literally tons of resources are
being stored in warehouses within the continental United
States, such as the Naval Supply Center in Oakland,
California. The subjective (political) influences in
this situation outweigh the simple objective (technical)
considerations for making resource allocation decisions
pertaining to the prepositioning of resources. Another
difficulty encountered with the prepositioning of
resources, is the fact that some host countries simply
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want to diminish the American presence and influence in
their country.
The decisions pertaining to the preposi tioning of
resources require a 'subjective' evaluation of political
situations within foreign countries and an assessment of
where future theaters of conflict may occur. The
consequences of this subjective evaluation is carried
forward throughout the entire Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System (PPBS) within the DOD and DON. As one
NBO official relates:
Do you buy everything and put it everywhere, or do you
select the most probable areas for future conflict and
preposition resources to those selected potential
theaters of conflict.
Obviously the first alternative (buy everything and
put it everywhere) is, on a practical'' basis
,
infeasible
due to the limited resources available for Department of
the Navy (DON) purposes. One is, therefore, drawn into
the necessity of having to make subjective evaluations
of foreign political situations.
FORCE READINESS VERSUS FORCE STRUCTURE. A resource
allocation strategy which directiy impacts decision
making within the Navy Budget Office (NBO) concerns the
conflict between force readiness versus force structure.
Resource requirements for force readiness include
funding needed to support primarily the operations
accounts, particularly for items which affect steaming
time for ships, flying time for aircraft, and training.
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Resource requirements for force structure include the
funding needed to support the investment accounts,
particularly for items which affect the procurement of
new ships, aircraft and equipment. The bottom line here
is that because of the limited funding available to the
Department of the Navy (DOM), it can be spent on opera-
ting and training or on buying updated equipment. The
amount of emphasis (funding) that should be placed upon
either function depends upon your perspective and is of
course the subject of much debate within the DOM
.
Proponents of force readiness believe that the greatest
emphasis should be placed upon utilizing the equipment
that we presently nave in our inventories and providing
more training time (steaming and flying hours) for the
available military manpower force. Proponents of force
structure foresee a need for acquiring increased technol-
ogy to counter the foreign naval threat. The determina-
tion of the 'correct' mixture between force readiness
and force structure, serves as a basis from which
resource allocation decisions within the Department of
the Navy (DON) will be determined.
NATO SPENDING. Other resource allocation (budget)
decisions within the Department of the Defense (DOD), is
influenced by the types of programs and equipment funded
for the purpose of supporting the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) countries in Europe. The amount and
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composition of programs (types of equipment, manning
requirements, etc.) devoted to NATO purposes by the DOD
and DOM is, to a large extent, predicated by the other
member nations within the organization. The nations
which comprise NATO are numerous and possess diverse
economic and military interests and objectives. Such a
composite of often conflicting interests, inherently,
results in an interjection of 'politically' based
decisions through the entire spectrum of resource
allocation decision making. NATO related resource
allocation decisions, within the DOD and DOM, require
the 'subjective' analysis of the political processes
within the member nations of MATO. The degree to which.
other member nations support (fund) the military efforts
of MATO serves as a basis for determining DOD and DOM
MATO related program composition and subsequent funding.
The broad (macro) factors and issues outlined above
directly or indirectly set the stage for subsequent
budget decisions within the Department 01 the Navy
(DOM). Zach has an impact upon budget decision making
at all levels within the Office of 3udget and Reports
(MCB)
.
Let us now examine the basic provisions of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1935 (Gramm-Rudman-Holl ings) and its impact upon the
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Department of the Navy's (DON) budget and its budget
decision making implications.
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act
of 1935 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) has presented budgeteers
within the federal government (including the Department
of Defense and the Department of the iJavy) with the
necessity of making definitive budget decisions on a
broader scale than has ever been faced before. Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings (GRH) establishes as a major objective of
eliminating the total federal deficit by the year 1991.
GRH requires that federal deficit target figures be
achieved in accordance with the time schedule contained
in Table Sight below.
TABLE EIGHT
"GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS DEFICIT
TARGET FIGURES TIME SCHEDULE"
(Bill ions)
[Ref. 12:PP. 2-14]







To achieve the Department of the Navy's (DON)
portion of the budget reductions required by Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings, the following reductions, as reflected
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in Table Mine below, were made for the budget years
Fiscal Year 1936 and prior.
TABLE MIME
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The President's Budget for Fiscal Year 1937 (in-
cluding the Department of the Navy's budget estimates),
as submitted to Congress, is considered to meet the
objectives of obtaining a balanced budget by 1991 and,
therefore, should not be subject to the provisions of
GRH. As stated by President Reagan in the '3udget of
the United States Government-Fiscal Year 1937':
. . . In so doing, my budget meets or exceeds the
deficit reduction targets set out in the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, commonly
known for its principal sponsors as Gramrri-Rudman-
Hollings.
Opponents within the Congress, however, do not agree
with the President's viewpoint and have recommended
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further adjustments (reductions) to the FY87 federal
budget. These proposed adjustments by. Congress upon the
Department of the Navy's (DON) FY87 budget estimates are
reflected in Table Ten below.
TABLE TEN
"DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET ADJUSTMENTS - FISCAL YEAR 1937"





Account Budget Ad iust Appropriation
Mil itary
Personnel
Navy 18.6 -1 .4 17.2
Marine Corps 5.5 -0.4 5.1
Operations and
Maintenance
Navy 26.3 -1 .4 25.4
Marine. Corps 1 .7 -0.1 1 .7
Procurement
Navy 35.7 -1 .3 33.9
Marine Corps 1 .7 -0.1 1 .7
RDTiS 1 1 .3 -1 .2 10.1
Military
Construction 2.1 -0.4 1 .7
Family Housing 0.7 -0.1 0.7
Stock Fund
Wavy 0.7 -0.1 0.6
Marine Corps Note 2 Note 2 Note 2
Total DON 104.8 -0 . 98.0
Total Navy 95.9 -6.3 89.6
Total Marine Cor ps 3.9 -0.4 3.5
Notes: (1) Figures subject to effects of
rounding.
(2) Less than $50 million.
The proposed appropriation figures outlined above
are, of course, subject to change as the differing
viewpoints toward Gramm-Rudman-Holl i ngs applicability to
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the Fiscal Year 1 9 87 is resolved and debated during the
upcoming months until final passage of the 'Budget of
the United States Government-Fiscal Year 1937'.
From a decision making- perspective, Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings (GRH) presents a budgeting enigma. V/hen viewed
from a broad point of view, GRH represents budget
decision making in the sense that Congress had to
consciously choose between the potential consequences of
not instituting federal deficit reducing legislation,
such as GRH, and the potential impact upon the economy
and national welfare by mandating required budget
reductions to achieve the elimination of the federal
deficit by 1991. Gramm-Rudman-Holl ings , when viewed
from a more localized perspective (Department of the
Navy), seems to possess no real traits of budgetary
decision making. 3y simply requiring an across-the-
board budget reduction of 4.9 percent within the federal
government, it may be proposed that Congress has not
made any real budget decisions or choices between
programs but merely shifted the burden of budget decision
making, required to achieve the objectives of GRH, upon
the various governmental departments. Due to the
enormous quantity of governmental programs funded by
the 'Budget of the United States' and the ever increasing
complexity and interrelationship between various govern-
mental programs and the overall nation's economy and
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•welfare, it is virtually impossible for legislators and
budgeteers to predict, with any reasonable assurance, the
impact of implementing any budget reducing piece of
legislation such as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. The effects
of GRH can only be observed as they occur and appropriate
adjustments made primarily on an 'after the fact' basis.
Highlighted within this chapter have been the
following issued and concepts: broad (macro) resource
allocation factors, both 'within and without the Depart-
ment of the Navy (DON), which influence budget decision
making by the Office of Budget and Reports (OBR) includ-
ing but not limited to: the goal of establishing and
maintaining a six hundred ship navy, the Commander-in-
Chief's dilemma, full versus partial funding, the
pre positioning of resources, force readiness versus force
structure, and NATO spending. The impact of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings upon the federal government is largely
undeterminable, thereby, placing legislators and budget-
eers alike into a 'wait and see' situation.
Within the next chapter we will explore the impact
of budget decision making upon four of the major Depart-
ment of the Mavy (DOM) appropriation accounts: military
personnel; operations and maintenance; procurement; and
research, development, test and evaluation. We will
also examine the budgetary decision making considerations
c-y
and their impact upon the budgeting process as it exists
within the Department of the "Javy (DOKT ).
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vi. decision making and navy budgeting
Before we discuss the decision making considerations
that impact the budgeting process within tne Department
of the Mavy (DON), we should first gain an understanding
of the overall DON oudgeting process. Table Eleven
below outlines tne budgeting process and time schedule
to be followed during the development of the Department
of tne navy's (DON) budget estimates. More specific
dates are published via separate NAVCOMPT notices each
budget year.
The budgetary process, within the Department of the
Navy (DON), can oest be described as a 'bottom up'
process involving practically all levels within the DON;
driven tne 'top down' policy guidance and direction.
The flow of budgetary guidance and budget estimates
within tne Department of the Navy (DON) budget cycle is
depicted in Table Twelve below.
TABLE ELEVEN
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The influence and importance of 'policy' issues from
the 'top down' can not be over emphasized. Policy
establishes the overall framework within which all
resource allocation (budgetary) decisions will ultimately
be determined. The overall objective of "policy' is the
maintenance of 'consistency' within the DOM budget
decision making process. To maintain budget consistency,
everyone within the resource allocation decision making
process must be cognizant of and adhere to the 'policy'
established from the 'top down'. 'Without a certain
degree of budget consistency, the credibility of budget
decisions, and sometimes even the decision makers
themselves, are subject to question and criticism. This
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concept: of 'unified thought' must exist at aii levels
throughout the DOT] budgetary system and particularly at
the departmental level (Navy Budget Office). As a Navy
budget official stated:
For the budget to be successful, everyone in the
decision making process must be, to some extent,
captives of leadership. Tne way it works, within the
DOD and regardless of tne fact that you are a high
ranking budget expert, is tnat if either the SECDEF
or SECNAV are for something, you pursue it.
Tne positive effect of budgeting consistency is a
focusing of the budgeting efforts upon the most important
programs or items as identified oy 'policy' objectives
and goais. The need Vor consistency, within tne Depart-
ment of the Navy (DOM) budgetary decision making process,
must be balanced against the negative effect of
consistency, that of 'stagnation'. Stagnation results in
the lacx of introduction of new ideas into the resource
axiocation decision making system. Too much consistency
can breed tne notion among budgeteers tnat, "We nave
always made budget decisions this way, why should we
change now". Obviously sucn an attitude, allowed to oe
introduced into the DOH budget system, would stymie one
of the most important characteristics of an effective
resource allocation decision making system, that of
'flexibility'. Flexibility allows for tne optimal
distribution or maximum utility of tne resources en-
trusted to the Department of the Navy (DOM). Without
budgeting flexibility, inefficiencies would inherently
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occur, resulting in the under utilization of tne re-
sources approved for use by tne Department of the Navy
(DON).
Within the Navy Budget Office (NBO), from tne budget
analyst to the Director of Budget and Reports (NCB), the
budget decision making process involves varying degrees
of subjective and objective influences. On the one
nana, there are strictly the numbers or "It makes tne
best business sense". On the other hand, there are the
politics or "It makes tne best political sense". Tne
relative importance of each viewpoint toward budgeting
is, of course, tne subject of mucn deoate. As one Mavy
official relates:
The resource allocation (budget) process is nothing
more or less tnan a subjective process. You, as future
Navy financial managers, will often become frustrated
when your superiors insist upon making budget" decisions
more upon suojective issues tnan upon technical or
economic issues. You must ae able to adapt to that.
The lower levels of budget decision making within
the wavy Budget Office (U30), that of the budget analyst,
can be described as being more oojective in nature as
opposed to the nighest level, that of the Director of
Budget and Reports (NCB), which is more subjective in
nature. As one progresses up tne budget decision making
chain of command, within the NBO, one can observe a
tradeoff between tne subjective and objective influences.
Budget analysts viev; budget decisions more in terms of
cost estimates, pricing, program schedule executability
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and prior oudget execution performance. Decision makers
at the higher levels within the NBO view the budget
decisions more in terms of what oenaviorai responses
will oe elicited as the result of a particular oudget
decision. It should be noted at this point, that at any
decision making level within the Navy Budget Office
(MBO), there exists a mixture of suojective and oojective
influences upon the budget decision making process. No
level of decision making witnin the MBO is therefore
totally devoid of seme degree of subjectivity or objec-
tivity. Tabie Thirteen below depicts the suojective
versus objective influences upon the decision making
process witnin the Navy 3udget Office (NBO):
TABLE THIRTEEN
"SUBJECTIVITY VERSUS OBJECTIVITY
OF THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS













Budget Analyst Budget Administrator
DECISION MAKING LEVEL
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Let us now explore the decision making considera-
tions, from the perspective of the Office of Budget and
Reports (03R), applicable to the formulation phase
(guidance, review, markup and reclama) of the Department
of the Navy (DON) budget cycle.
The Office of Budget and Reports (03R). during the
budgeting pnase of the Planning, Programming and Budget-
ing System (PP3S), prepares and reviews the DOM budget
estimates for submission to the Secretary of trie Navy
(SECNAV) and tne Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD). Tne first year of the Program Objectives Memoran-
dum (POM) Five Year Defense Plan (FYD?) is used as a
oaseline for reviewing all aspects of each program's
budget estimates. Emphasis is given to ensure that a
particular program is both executable and correctly
priced, as well as reflecting various late arriving
guidance and direction from Congress, the Office of
Management and Budget (0M3), the Office of tne Secretary
of Defense (OSD) and the Secretary of tne Navy (SECNAV).
The ultimate oojective of the formulation phase is tne
forwarding of the final DON budget estimates to OSD and
OMB for subsequent review, approval and incorporation
into tne President's budget.
Budget formulation describes the events which must
be performed during tne development and review of tne
Department of tne Navy (DON) budget estimates. The
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formulation phase of the DON budgetary cycle consists of
the following subac tivi ties [Ref. 9: p. 2-1]:
- tne issuance of program and tecnnical guidance
- the' estimating of resource requirements to meet the
program and technical guidance
- tne preparation of budget documents and supporting
data in the format required oy reviev; ecneions
- the nearings, analyses and recommendations developed
at each level within tne executive branch.
To initiate the budget formulation phase, the OBR
issues budgetary guidance to be followed during tne
preparation of tne DON budget estimates. The purpose of
budget guidance, as outlined in the NAVCOHPT Manual
(Volume Seven), is stated as follows:
Budget guidance is issued to- assure consistency in the
preparation of budget estimates throughout tne Depart-
ment of the Navy.
It snould be noted that the budget guiaance provided
oy the Office of Budget and Reports is a composite of
policy directives received from various organizations,
principally SECKAV, OSD , OMB and Congress. The budget
guidance issued by tne OBR can be described as being
substantive or technical in perspective. Substantive
guidance is promulgated in the form of standing manuals,
notices and instructions. Principal among these docu-
ments is the NAVCOMPT Manual (Volume Seven) which
outlines the broad budgetary procedures and processes
within the Department of the Navy (DON). General
technical guidance (now to) is provided by the OBR
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through the Budget Guidance Manual (NAVCOMPINST 7102. 2A)
with more specific complementary technical guidance
issued via NAVCOMPTNOTICES 7110 AND 7111 series. The
importance and impact of policy guidance (from a suojec-
tive perspective) upon the DON oudget decision making
process was discussed earlier in this chapter.
The oudget review (markup) portion of the formulation
phase is set into motion by the Office of Budget and
Reports issuing a 'budget call' to the various Headquar-
ter activities throughout the Department of the Navy.
Each headquarter activity, at its discretion, dissemi-
nates cne OBR guidance with its own supplementary
guidance, to lower echelons as required to obtain their
participation in tne development of the DOM budget
estimates. The amount of time required to coulee; and
synthesize their respective oudget estimates is predicted
upon now far down tne resource allocation chain of
command allowances nave been made for budget estimates
to be introduced into the decision making process. Tne
deeper into the user area from which the initial oudget
estimates are introduced into the budget system, the
more accurately will tne oudget estimates reflect tne
resource requirements of tne various components within
the DOM. Tne strengths derived from the oudget inputs
of the lower levels, within the decision making process,
often make it more cumbersome to utilize at tne
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secretariate ievex due to the diversification and sheer
volume of the budget estimates. It should be emphasized
that as a staff office, tne Office of Budget and Reports
has no responsibility for making programmatic related
decisions but is responsible for surfacing basic program
issues which have a direct influence upon the budget and
for delineating tne budgeting implications of these
program questions.
Budget analysts, within tne Navy Budget Office view
the initial budget estimates with a preconceived 'down-
ward oasis'. This 'cutting' viewpoint, on behalf of i'30
budget analysts, assumes that there is always some amoun'
of funding which can be cue from the situation in which
the initial funding estimates for the various JO:!
programs are made during the programming pnase of tne
Planning, Programming and Budgeting Systems (PPB3).
Because the programming phase occurs during tne earlier
portion of the cost estimation process, it is subject to
more uncertainty witn regard to 'actual' program costs.
Consequently, program officials tend to over-estimate
total program costs in order to compensate for this
greater degree of uncertainty. As one iJBO official
stated:
You never 1 know exactly what a program is z°-^Z to cost
until you pay for it.
While some degree of accuracy in program cost
estimates during tne programming phase is required,
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sosa. accuracy is, on the other nana, not essential an:i
to a certain extent not desireable. Another Navy Budget
Office (NBO) official relates:
During the programming phase, budget figures plus or
minus ten percent is OK. Too much time is often spent
(during the programming phase) trying to decide how
much, instead of if.
During the formulation phase of the budgeting cycle,
the Office of Budget and Rezorzo analysts review the
budget estimates, submitted by the various submitting
offices, to determine the 'reasonableness 1 of she budget
essi.nases. Credibility and beiievabil i ty are an integra.
part of the relationship between the submitting official;
and tne OBR oudges review personnel. Credibility
const i tuses tne subjective side of tne 'reasonableness'
of tne Department of tne Navy budget estimates. As one
[Javy budget official states:
If you nave credibility with your anaiyss, even if you
are wrong you are right, oecause ne can help you wish ;
f ix
.
By having credibility with tne respecsive appropria-
tion account staff analyst within tne Office of Budget
and Reports, a working relationship d2\'eiop3 where
problems witn initial oudget estimates are resolved
prior to the markup and reciania process. If the OBI
staff analyst is fully cognizant of the justifications
of tne oud^ec estimates and the submitting officials
have credibility ana tne oudget estimates makes good
business senr^e , tne budget estimates are much more
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' defendabie ' by the OBR staff analyse anci therefore nave
a higher probability of making it through the markup and
reclama process in a form. similar go tnai which was
initially submitted. As another Navy budget official
stated :
The best way to get your money back, is never to have
lost it in tne first piace.
Credibility between the submitting officials and tne
Navy Budget Office staff analysts is not something that
is developed within a short period of time. Credibility
with M30 staff analysts develops omy through the
display of a proven history (track record) of providing
accurate, up-to-date and reliable budgeting information
peculiar to their particular activity. As a Navy Budget
Office official a g a i n restates:
Hard work is tne price you pay to have credibility, y ou
can not achieve credibility based scie±y upon your baby
blues.
After reviewing the 'reasonableness' of an tne
submitting activities' budget estimates, tne Office of
Budget and Reports proposes changes to these budget
estimates by issuing 'marks' against the various appro-
priation accounts. These marks are distributed to the
respective Department of the Navy components, thereby
providing them an opportunity to 'reclama' tne proposed
cuts or marks. To ensure full dissemination of the
budget decisions, tne budget marks are also distributed
to the Secretary of the Navy to ensure the fullest
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exposure of the conflicting resource allocation issues
from tne lowest to the highest leveis throughout the
Department of the Mavy.
During the 'reciarna' process of the formulation
phase of tne DON budgetary cycle, the submitting activi-
ties' rebuttal justifications are reviewed by tne Office
of Budget and Reports staff personnel. Of primary
importance to tne submitting activities, when formulating
their reclamas, is tne need to 'address the facts' upon
which the original marks were based. A relatively
unsuccessful reciarna technique, often employed by
submitting officials, is what has seen referred to as
tne 'Nuremberg defense' vmere the most frequently
expressed reciarna justification has oeen, "Look, I'm
only doing my job, the CO has put a high priority on
funding this program". 3ucn a defense is based, not
upon tne merits or business sense of tne program, but
simply upon the personal desires of a commanding officer
to nave a particular program funded. An equally unsuc-
cessful reciarna technique is tne reliance upon tne '600
ship defense' wnere tne reciarna justification expressed,
by submitting officials is that "Funding for this
program (item) is required to help us achieve the
SECNAV's stated objective of establishing and supporting
a 600 ship navy". Both of tne above reciarna justifica-
tion techniques nave proven, during the long run, to be
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equally ineffective. To put it more -simply, the reclama
process must address the issues (facts) upon which the
original marks were predicted.
Let us now turn our direction toward some of tine
technical and more objective considerations given by tr">~
Office of Budget and Reports staff analysts during tne
review (markup) process of the formulation phase for the
following four appropriation accounts: military person-
nel; operations and maintenance; procurement; and
researcn, development, test and evaluation. Navy budget
analysts review tne budget estimates for these four
appropriation accounts with the following considerations
i n m i n d .
MILITARY PERSONNEL. Of the primary consideration to
the Military Personnel (MILPERS) appropriation accounts
is the determi nation of the average cost rates utilized
by the Chief of naval Operations and the Commandant of
the Marine Corps in tne formulation of their MILPERS
budget estimates. Although the rate of military pay and
allowances are established by law, tne avera e rate of
base pay (the largest contributor to the MILPERS account)
is established from estimates. The following estimates
bear directly upon the level of tne MILPERS appropriation
account [Ref. 9: pp. 2-31]: tne number of promotions
expected to occur during tne budget year, the number of
personnel gains or losses to occur during tne budget
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year, and the longevity to accrue during tne budget year.
Uti±izing the above estimates, an average coot rate is
computed for each paygrade from 2-1 through 0-10. This
average cost rate is applied to the total number of
estimated personnel anticipated for each paygrade. A
similar. procedure is utilized to determine the average
cost rate for basic allowance for quarters. Important
consideration must oe given by the Office of Budget and
Reports budget analysts to the estimated personnel
turnover rate which affects tne cost of allowances for
such things as permanent changes-of-station , reenlistment
bonuses, clothing for new recruits and separations [Ref.
9: pp. 2-311.
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE. Review considerations
by tne OBR analysts for tne operations and maintenance
appropriation accounts vary with the type of program
under consideration. The determination of tne 'reason-
ableness' of budget estimates for the operations and
maintenance accounts is based principally upon past
experience, work measurement standards, cost accounting
information, employment trends, price ±evel changes and
prior budget execution performance. Cost data and work
measurements are used with reasonable accuracy to
determine the funding requirements for programs such as
the overhaul of snips, overhaul of aircraft, fleet
operations, flight observations, medical care, supply
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distribution and real property m a i n t e n a n c e [ R e f . 9 : ? P •
2-31]. There is no standard methodology oy which
analysts within the Navy Budget Office review trie
operations and maintenance accounts.
PROCUREMENT. The principal consideration for the
procurement appropriation accounts is tne determination
of an accurate 'unit cost'. The cost estimation for
'existing' items is derived through tne available cost
accounting systems. The cost estimation for 'new' item;
is derived through tne use of engineering; cost estimate;
and the following factors [Ref. 9:pp. 2-32]:
- amount of inventory on hand
- projected consumption rate
- requirement for spare parts
- status of RDT1E programs
- production time schedules
- slippage of production schedule
- required lead time
- mobilization base
- approval for production.
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION. The
total funding for Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDTaE), within the Department of Defense is
maintained at approximately a constant percentage of ai.
DOD appropriations. Although this percentage may vary
within eacn military department, according to emphasis
~>
5
given by the Secretary of Defense on various programs, a
reiativeiy steady ievei of funding is maintained for the
totai RDT^E efforts within the Department of the Navy.
Cost estimate methods utilized for the above appropria-
tions are not applicable to the RDTiE appropriations due
to the fact that RDTdZ programs are not typically similar
and that operational standards are not usually available.
At the higher level within the decision making process.
the primary RDT&E budgeting consideration is determining
what total level of RDTiE effort is required, in what
areas further research is required and the availability
of scientific personnel and research facilities. Trie
RDT&E programs are funded incrementally, therefore
allowing the review of 'unobligated' and 'unexpended'
balances to become the principal methodology by which
RDT&E program performance execution may be monitored and
the required future financial requirements determined.
After the claimants have submitted their budget
requests to the various Department of the Navy departmen-
tal analysts, those requests are reviewed for the
summary and backup data required to support the requests.
Thereafter, nearin^s are scheduled for the analyst to
get additional information (as required) concerning the
budget inputs in question. If and when the hearings are
conducted, they will nave been preceded by questions
from tne analyst which are sent to tne submitting office
37
for that activity to prepare a statement in support of
their original subr;,i5s:on.
The Comptroller 01 the Navy 'narks' are tnen made as
adjustments, corrections or reflections of decisions
made concerning the different appropriations; most marks
involve budgetary reductions or cuts. Reasons for an
these adjustments are ~iven to tne submitting offices by
the determining analyst and are tne oasis for tne
'reciama' process. ilCBG (Budget Evaluation Group) makes
tne distribution of che 'marks' in return to the
respective submitting activities as they are completed by
tne analysts.
The 'reclamas' are then resubmitted by tne claimant
which makes tne markup only a 'tentative decision' until
tne reciama can be sorted out and final disposition made
upon it. As stated earlier within this thesis, these
decisions are usually sorted out at tne Director of
Budget ana Reports ieve_ and an agreement reached
between tne cognizant NCB 'director' and tne submitting
activity concerning the markup decision.
Tne Budget Guidance llanuai ( NAVCOMPTINST 7102. 2A)
addresses ten common areas in wnich markups usually
occur. They are outlined as follows:
APPROVAL FOR PRODUCTION. One of tne principal
factors utilized in tne formulation of appropriation
budgets is the readiness of placing a particular piece
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of equipment into production. "JAVCOMPT analysts devote
particular attention to scheduled milestones leading to
a production decision.
UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS. Unfunded requirements can oe
categorized into two basic categories: pre and post POM
submission. Prior to the submission of the POM, those
programs that cannot be executed because of improper
pricing or unbalance with respect to other appropria-
tions, are sent back to tne resource sponsors and are
funded with 'offsets' in coordination with tne DOMPIC.
Shortfalls which occur following tne submission 01 a
POM, over which tne resource sponsor das no control are
funded without requiring offsets from other programs.
PRICING. One of tne primary objective of the review
process of tne 'budget review decisions' is to ensure
that the program pricing is reasonable and follows
published guidance. Pricing markups reflect pricing
guidance received subsequent to tne submission of
initial budget estimates.
PROGRAM EXECUTABILITY. Determinations as to whether
or not the program can be carried out luring the budget
year becomes a key consideration during the review
process. Items sucn as ieadtimes of end and support
items, are properiy phased, the availability of long
leadtime materials, achievable production rates, and the
39
probability that all deliveries will occur within the
funded period, are reviev/ed to ensure executaoili ty
.
PROGRAM DECISION MEMORANDUM. Because of the schedule
of events during the overall Department of Defense
budget review process, programmed decisions from trie
Secretary of Defense on tne Department of the iJavy
oudgetary matters are usually received 'during' trie DON
review process. These programmed decisions are therefore
included in the appropriation markups.
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION. Markups are issued which
reflect the latest Congressional actions and guidance
and direction.
AUDIT SAVINGS. These marxups ensure that audit
savings are reflected where appropriate. Markups ensure
that valid savings remain within the Department cf the
ilavy and are not lost back to the Office of the Secretary
of Defenze
.
INTERAPPROPRIATIONAL TRANSFERS. Checks are made to
ensure that each item is budgeted within tne correct
appropriation and if transfers are required, that they
are made -to tne correct appropriation.
PRIOR YEAR PERFORMANCE. In reviewing tne budget
estimates, analysts will ensure that funds are budgeted
for the year in which tney are required. Low obligation-
ai and expenditure rates reflect 'forward funding' or
funding whicn is in advance of annual requirements. An
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unusually high ooligationai rate may reflect a funding
shortfall. Rephasings would oe recommended as appropri-
ate to eliminate such discrepancies.
OUTYEARS. Although tne primary emphasis of the
markup process is upon tne budget year and the authoriza-
tion year, 'outyear 1 adjustments are made to reflect
accurately trie impact of tne program and funding deci-
sions made during the budget review as well as the
impact of fiscal reality.
Let us now review the Fiscal Year 1937 markup
justifications for tne following appropriation accounts:
Weapons Procurement (V.'PiJ); Shipbuilding and Conversion,
Navy (SCM); Aircraft Procurement, Mavy; Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTocE); Otner Procure-
ments, Wavy (0PM); and Operations and Maintenance, Mavy
COKN)
.
Tne markup justifications and adjustments are shown
for FY87 Department of the Navy appropriation accounts
in Table Fourteen. Tnis taoie dispxays the frequency of
occurrences of a particular type of markup by appropria-
tion category. It does noc display the amount (dollar)
or impact of tne issued mark but merely points out zhe
reasons why a particular mark was made. The accounts
that are not listed ana reflected in Table Fourteen
displayed little analysis worthy data for the purposes
of this study. The markup justifications were 30
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diversified that tne data could not be categorized
properly under the above specific markup justifications.
As the various markup justifications themselves were
reviewed, it became apparent that tne different analysts
used different terms to describe the marks that they
made for tne different terms to describe the marks that
they made for the different appropriation accounts. A
good example of this was tne term 'forward funding' used
by an analyst which in reality was 'prior year
performance' as mentioned earlier within this chapter.
There were similarly non-standardized usage of the
reasons and justifications for the marks. As one Office
of Budget and Reports (03 R) official stated:
Tne specific terms used may vary a small oit but tne
essence of tne requirement is non-varying.
Overall, the marks varied greatly between appropria-
tions and tne analyst's techniques for review were also
as varied. There was no particular methodology utilized
by individual budget analysts within tne 03R . Tne
analysts used facts, developed facts and passed the
facts up to tne senior reviewing officials for their
increasingly subjective decisions. As indicated by the
largely diverse terms used in tne marks, the same
requirements and ideas were protected Out tne methods of
arriving at thern individually continued to differ.
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TA3LE FOURTEEN
"TYPES OF MARKUP JUSTIFICATIONS USED 3Y 03R
BUDGET ANALYSTS FOR MAKING CUTS IN SIX DON
APPROPRIATION ACCOUNTS"
(Number of Occurrences - Note 1)
Tvoe of Markup ir/PN SCN :dt^e opn o:u;
Approval for




































Requ irements 17 17
Pric ing 6 2 23 3 53 23 113
Program






Notes: 1) Numbers do not reflect the amount (dollar)
impact of a particular markup, merely the
number of occurrences for each type markup
justification .
2) Totals reflect number markup occurrences by
'Type of Markup Justification'
3) Totals reflect number of markup occurrences
by 'Appropriation Account'.
In order to view the marks from a decision making
perspective, it is necessary to observe where the marks
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were ;nade and now they were adjusted. Each of the six
appropriation accounts contained in T a o x e Fifteen below
had marks made in the ten major areas discussed earlier
within this chapter. Trends may be identified by
observing the percentages of marks that were taken iron
the total marks in eacn appropriation account (remember
the downward bias). The percentage of markup justifica-
tions are reflected in Table Fifteen below.
MILITARY PERSONNEL. This appropr ia
t
icnai category
includes the following appropriation actions: Military
Personnel- Navy (MPN), Military Personnel -Marine Corps
(MPMC), Reserve Personnel-Marine Corps (RPMC). These
accounts were not included in tne above analysis due to
the particularly diverse and varied use of markup
justifications and terminology.
PROCUREMENT. This appropr iational category includes
the following appropriation accounts: Aircraft Procure-
ment-davy (API!), Shipbuilding & Conversion-Havy (SCN).
Weapons Procurement-Navy (WPN), Other Procurement-Navy
(OPM) and Procurement-Marine Corps (PMC). Tne Procure-
ment-Marine Corps (PMC) account was not incxuded in the
above analysis due to that particular appropriation
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T r a n s f e r
? r i o r Year-
Performance
Other (s)
4.4 9.2 o. o 2.0
10.5 7.7 1 5.7 10.0 24.5
1 .0 0.9 9
•
1.3 22. D
Notes: 1) Percentages reflect number of occurrences
by Appropriation account
Within the Weapons Procurement-Navy appropriation
account, the most influential markups were due to
'Approval for Production 1 which accounted for 24.31 of
the totai adjustments for this account. The second mos
important markup was due to 'Program Executability'
wnose influence was 22.9'^. The third most influential
markup was due to 'Congressional Action' which
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compromised 19.1$ of tne total markups for this account..
The fourth major influential markup was due to 'Unfunded
requirements' -which constituted 16.2$ of the total
Weapons Procurenent-Mavy markups.
Within the Shipbuilding & Conversion-Navy appropria-
tion account there were three major markup justification;
utilized for reducing (cutting) this account. They
were, in descending order of influence, 'Approval for
Production', 'Congressional Action', and 'Pricing',
whose individual influences were 46.2/j, 30.83 and 15.41
respectively.
'Within the Aircraft Procurement-Wavy appropriation
account, tne most influential markup was due to 'Program
Zxecu tabii i ty ' which constituted 33. 9. » of the totai
markups for this account. The next largest influences
was due to 'Pricing' at 20.4$, 'Congressional Action 1
with 19.5$ and 'Approval for Production' with 14.2/J.
Within the Other Procurement-Navy appropriation
account, tne most influential markup was 'Program
Executabiiity ' with 39.43 of tne total markups for this
appropriation account. 'Program Executabiiity' was
followed rather closely oy 'Pricing' which constituted
33.1^ of the markup justifications.
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION. Within
the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation appropria-
tion account, 'Congressional Action' was by far the
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predominate markup influence with 56.0% of the tota_L
markups for this appropriation account. The next
highest markup justifications were 'Program Executabil-
i ty ' anci 'Appropriational Transfer' with a d i s t a n t 1 1 . '4 %
and 9.2Tj respectively.
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE. The Operations and
Maintenance appropriational category consists of the
following appropriation accounts: Operations and
Maintenance-Navy (OMN), Operations and Maintenance-
Marine Corp's (Oi'n-iC), Operations and Maintenance-Navy
Reserve (OMNR) and Operations and Maintenance-Marine
Corps Reserve (OMMCR). The most influential markups for
this appropriation category consisted of, in descending
order of priority, 'Pricing', 'Prior Year Performance'
and 'Program Executability' whose influences were 2 3 . 6 :,!>
,
24.53 and a more distant 18.4,; respectively.
By viewing the statistics contained within Table
Fifteen above, ic can be determined which 'Type of
Markup Justification' exercised the most influence upon
the budget decisions for the six appropriation accounts
reflected witnin Table Fifteen. For the Department of
tne Navy (DON) for Fiscal Year 1937, 'Program Executable
ity' accounted for 26.2$ of tne total markups reviewed.
Giving soiid credibility to tne comments made by Budget
Evaluation Group (NCBG) personnel as discussed earlier
within tnis tne sis. 'Congressional Action' played a
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21. 2:^ influence- with 'Pricing' next in order of influence
witn 13.3 .i - The remaining markup justif ica lions nad
lesser influences anci effects on the overall budget and,
with exception of 'Approval for Production ' ana 'Prior
Year Performance' with 10.0$ and 9-8% respectively, were
widely distributed.
The three largest and most influential factors in
the review and markup process as can be seen from the




Congressional action and pricing) as discussed
throughout this thesis are indeed cornerstones upon
which tne majority of budget decision actions are based.
Congressional actions played a predominate role
within che Research, Development, Tesc and Evaluation
(RDT&E) account and was evident in every procurement
account displayed in Taoie Fifteen with a heavier
emphasis in the Aircraft Procurement-Navy and Weapons
Procurement-Navy accounts. Obviously the interest
exhibited by Congress in these Department of tne Wavy
appropriation accounts indicates a particularly strong
desire by that group to 'keep the purse strings' and
control tne accounts which affect their districts in
terms of contractual support.
Because the budget is tne ultimate management tool
in the federal government, it may aiso be argued that
tne Congress, through its use of the monetary
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constraints, are the individuals actually making military
policy and decisions.
The major decisions being made within the Department
of the Navy are presently being made from a 'fiscal or
business' decision base vice an 'operational' base
created from evaluated threats.
Highlighted within this cnapter nave been the
following issues and concepts pertinent go the budget
decision making process within the Office of Budget and
Reports (OUR) and the impact of sucn budget decision
making upon the overall Department of the ilavy (DON)
oudget. The budgeting process within tne OBR is subject
to oo:n subjective and objective influences, with the
lower levels being more subjective in their budget
sec is ion making orientation. The objective (technical)
considerations play a secondary (taken for granted) role
beside the subjective (political) considerations during
tne formulation of tne DON oudget. The 'Big Three'
markup justifications (reductions) consist of, in
descending order of occurrence, are as follows: program
executaoility, Congressional action and pricing.
Congressional actions plays a predominate influencing
roie on tne research, development, test and evaluation
appropriation account and is evident in ail procurement
accounts, especially aircraft and weapons procurement.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
Due co the limited resources available for utiliza-
tion by tne Department of the Navy, it is becoming more
encumbent, upon everyone in a resource allocation decision
making capacity to think more in economic terms versus
opera 'clonal and hardware requirements and capabilities.
Increased emphasis upon reducing the amount of the
federal deficit (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) requires that
everyone achieve greater levels of utility with respect
to the resources (funding) entrusted to tnem for defense
pur' poses. Gaining a greater knowledge and appreciation
of the roie and function of the bud set d< s ion max in ~,
process as it exists within trie DON is tne first step-in
the right direction toward achieving tne elusive goal of
every military official, tnat of obtaining 'more bang
for tne (available) buck'. As one Navy budget official
reia ted :
Tne most important endeavor which a Naval officer can
pursue, during peacetime, is tnat of oudgeting. Tne
Navy wants is officers to manage, not simply add up
numbers
.
The 'Budget of tne United Stsces', of which tne
Department of the Navy's budget is subset, is tne
principal necnanism by which resources are transformed
into designed courses of action to acnieve tne desired
and stated defense goals and objectives. The 'budget'
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is therefore primarily a management and decision making
tool and much more than a simple accounting methodology
oy which to "track the distribution of resources entrusts:
:o the DOM. Budgeteers nave been described oy a Uavy
budget official as being somewhat synonymous to a
i iscai nav l^ator 'n order for a 'fiscal navisat<
go keep fro.;: running aground on any of the budgeting
hazards and shoals described earlier in tnis thesis, he
must possess an accurate knowledge of the framework
within which resource allocation (budgetary) decisions
are made. If the 'fiscal navigator' is fully aware of
the budgeting 'Hazards' which must oe faced, he can more
successfully formulate a resource allocation (budget)
pian which no: only meets the operational requirements
of his command but a budget pian which can oe incorpo-
rated into the overall Department of the Navy's resource
allocation (budget) pian.
Budgeting within the Department of the Navy is
nothing more than a specialized form of decision making:
Effective budget decision making requires the constant
and accurate evaluation of both the political and
technical influences within the overall budgeting
environment. Instead of describing a budget as a
' zeora' whose colors are either black or white, a budget
can be more accurateiy described as bein^; more attuned
to a 'chameleon' whose shade of color reflects the
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influences of the environment within which it operates.
The technical aspect of Navy budgeting is for a_^
practical purposes taken for granted. Tne derivation of
'correct' budget numbers serves as tne baseline upon
which ail other budget factors are introduced in order
to formulate the 'final' budget numbers.
Tne following topics are submitted as subject areas
for further study and investigation: determining tne
budgetary impact (role) played oy various governmental
agencies upon tne DOM military personnel, procurement,
operations and maintenance, and RDTaE appropriation
accounts, from tne component's initiax oudgei: estimates
to the budget estimates contained within the President's
budget; delineating in more detail tne role differences
and functions performed by the Director of Budget and
Reports (NCB), and also as tne Director of tne Fiscal
Management Division (9P-92) on behalf of the Secretary
of tne Havy (SECNAV), and tne Chief of Java! Operations
(CMO); investigating in further detail tne impact of any
one of tne broad (macro) factors which influence tne
oudget decision making within tne Department of tne
Navy; exploring the different perspectives toward
budgeting (political versus technical) by budget analyse,
and budget administrators; and the impact of the 'big
three' marxup factors upon the Department of tne iiavy
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